Messaging: end-to-end instead of datakrake
Your messages belong to you — or to the provider. The difference is architecture. Concrete steps, no fearmongering.
What is your threat model?
- Everyday (family, friends, colleagues): end-to-end encryption by default, open code, minimal data collection.
- Sensitive (work, journalistic sources): minimise metadata, disappearing messages, own servers for the highest bar.
- Maximum (activists, whistleblowers): Tails/QubesOS setups, no phone number.
The comparison (evidenced)
| Criterion | Signal | Telegram | Olvid | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| E2EE by default | Yes | Yes | No (secret chats only) | Yes |
| Open client code | Partial | Yes | Partial | Yes |
| Metadata collection | Yes (Meta) | Minimal | Yes | Minimal |
| State-certified | No | No | No | Yes (ANSSI, France) |
Core recommendation for most: Signal — the conservative choice for E2EE + open code + minimal metadata. Even the French government’s Olvid circular (6428/SG) doesn’t claim Signal is technically weaker; it argues sovereignty (see the Olvid dossier).
For decentralists: Matrix/Element (self-hostable), SimpleX Chat (no phone number, no central identity).
Steps
- Install Signal; share username rather than phone number; enable disappearing messages for sensitive chats.
- Migrate WhatsApp groups step by step — everyone decides for themselves.
- Backups: local encrypted, not cloud backups.
- Journalists: SecureDrop or Signal for sources.
Debunking
False: “Signal is a CIA Trojan.” — The claim circulates because Signal’s protocol work received US funding (OTF). Evidence of a backdoor: none. Evidence: E2EE, open code, independent audits.
Also false: “Telegram is secure because it has secret chats.” — Standard Telegram chats sit unencrypted on servers. Secret chats are the exception, not the default.